Quotes by Hilary Kornblith

Hilary Kornblith

17th century philosophers were not in a position to understand the mind as well as we can today, since the advent of experimental methods in psychology. It shows no disrespect for the brilliance of Descartes or Kant to acknowledge that the psychology which they worked with was primitive by comparison with what is available today in the cognitive sciences, any more than it shows disrespect for the brilliance of Aristotle to acknowledge that the physics he worked with does not compare with that of Newton or Einstein.

Disrespect

Mind

Psychology

Bealer argues that the kind of naturalistic view which Quine holds will rob him of the ability to make the normative claims which (many) naturalists wish to make in epistemology. I don’t think this is right about Quine, but I’m certain it’s not right about my own view. To the extent that I can show that talk of knowledge is firmly rooted within empirical theories where it plays an important explanatory role, I thereby demonstrate its naturalistic credentials.

Play

Thinking

Views

Bealer has a number of reasons for thinking that a naturalistic epistemology is self-undermining. Let me focus on one of these. (I’ve tried to take on all of them in the first chapter of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.)

Numbers

Self

Thinking

But there is no doubt that my own views on this are, in quite a number of ways, very different from those of Quine.

Doubt

Numbers

Views

By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first time.

Believe

Perspective

Views

Chemists in earlier centuries were quite interested in the nature of acids. They had no interest in analysing their concept of acid. After all, they knew that their understanding of acids was at a fairly primitive level, and what they wanted to do was understand something about the world better – the nature of acidity – not something about their own concepts.

Levels

Understanding

World

Epistemologists should be concerned with knowledge and justification and so on, not our concepts of them; philosophers of mind should be concerned with various features of our mental life and the large-scale structure of the mind, not our concepts of mind, or consciousness, or anything else

Consciousness

Mind

Philosopher

Ethologists thus have an interest in looking at these capacities for the reliable acquisition of belief, and it is not surprising that they have a name for the true beliefs which are the typical product of these reliable capacities. They call them items of knowledge. So I argue that talk of knowledge may thereby be seen to be embedded within a successful empirical theory.

Acquisition

Names

Successful

Externalists reject any such view. I think that the idea that we can tell, simply by way of reflection, whether our beliefs are justified, is deeply commonsensical. More than that, the idea that responsible epistemic agents ought to reflect on their beliefs, and hold them only if they somehow pass muster, is utterly natural.

Reflection

Thinking

Views

For one thing, I think that there are questions which philosophers raise which, although science bears on them, are not typically the central focus of those who work in the sciences. At the same time, I don’t have a view of philosophy which marks it out as different in kind from scientific work

Philosophy

Thinking

Views

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Acquisition

Agreement

Aluminum

Analogies

Animal

Attitude

Attractive

Bears

Believe

Cases

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Quotes by Hilary Kornblith

Hilary Kornblith

Bealer has a number of reasons for thinking that a naturalistic epistemology is self-undermining. Let me focus on one of these. (I’ve tried to take on all of them in the first chapter of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.)

But there is no doubt that my own views on this are, in quite a number of ways, very different from those of Quine.

By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first time.

Epistemologists should be concerned with knowledge and justification and so on, not our concepts of them; philosophers of mind should be concerned with various features of our mental life and the large-scale structure of the mind, not our concepts of mind, or consciousness, or anything else

For one thing, I think that there are questions which philosophers raise which, although science bears on them, are not typically the central focus of those who work in the sciences. At the same time, I don’t have a view of philosophy which marks it out as different in kind from scientific work

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